Saturday, December 21, 2013
BlackBerry Posts Huge Loss on Write-Down and Charges
Thursday, November 22, 2012
DealBook: Some Question Numbers in H.P.'s Write-Down
The “kitchen sink” charge, in which all kinds of write-downs and costs are rolled into one gargantuan number, is something of a ritual in corporate America. The $8.8 billion charge that Hewlett-Packard announced on Tuesday, however, shows why such moves should be scrutinized carefully.
H.P. took the charge in its fourth quarter to reflect the reduced value of Autonomy, the British software firm that it bought last year for about $10 billion. The computing giant said it had discovered “serious accounting improprieties” at Autonomy, including what it said were ruses that inflated revenue and profitability metrics.
H.P. contends that such accounting improprieties were behind more than $5 billion of the $8.8 billion charge. For some analysts, that didn’t add up.
“Out of the $8.8 billion, I’d be very surprised if more than a couple of billion was due to accounting improprieties,” said Aswath Damodaran, a professor of finance at New York University’s Stern School of Business.
In other words, the skeptics say they think H.P. may be overstating the financial effects of the supposed accounting chicanery. They say that H.P.’s management may have wanted to write off as much of Autonomy as possible, and that the accounting allegations allowed it to increase the charge.
This move, of course, hurt H.P’s fourth-quarter earnings. But a big charge has the advantage of cleaning the slate for the next fiscal year for the company’s chief executive, Meg Whitman. With Autonomy now only a small part of H.P.’s balance sheet, there is a much smaller chance that the troubled division will lead to more embarrassing write-downs. The Autonomy acquisition was initiated by H.P.’s previous chief executive, Léo Apotheker.
Evaluating the validity of the charge requires understanding exactly what H.P. was writing down.
When a company accounts for an acquisition, it assesses the value of the target, subtracting its liabilities from its assets. It then compares this so-called fair value with the price it is paying. If it is paying more than the fair value, the difference is recorded as good will on the buyer’s balance sheet. When H.P. acquired Autonomy, it got roughly $4 billion of intangible assets (Autonomy’s expertise, intellectual property and brand recognition) and recorded roughly $6 billion of good will. In the charge announced Tuesday, H.P. slashed the value of both, effectively saying Autonomy was worth 80 percent less than it originally thought.
In some ways, an 80 percent reduction might seem deserved, if Autonomy was in fact cooking its books. But despite their accusations, H.P. executives in a conference call did not seem to present a dire picture of Autonomy. The ruses, if that’s what they were, helped revenue and profits, but probably not enough to account for $5 billion of the charge, said Anup Srivastava, an assistant professor at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. “I can’t justify it,” he said.
Autonomy’s revenue benefited from one alleged ruse, but only by 10 to 15 percent, according to Hewlett. Catherine A. Lesjak, the H.P. chief financial officer, said Tuesday that without accounting tricks, Autonomy would have appeared less profitable. But it was still making money, according to her figures.
Without the tricks, Ms. Lesjak said, Autonomy probably had operating margins as high as 30 percent, compared with as much as 45 percent with them. And on Tuesday, Ms. Whitman said Autonomy could still be something of a “growth engine” for H.P.
Still, some people think the charge may be reasonable. In assessing the size of an impairment charge, companies focus on projections of cash flows from the affected divisions. If H.P. can show that Autonomy’s cash generation is far below its expectations, and that cooking the books largely hid that, the charge may be sound, said Cynthia Jeffrey, associate professor of accounting at Iowa State University.
“If there’s fraud involved and that wasn’t found during due diligence, the whole thing could be valueless,” she said.
H.P. could argue that the high valuation it placed on Autonomy’s cash flows looks all the more untenable in light of the legerdemain allegations, and that that’s why it had to take the charge.
When asked to comment on the charge, an H.P. spokesman, Michael Kuczkowski, e-mailed a list of what he said were the improper accounting maneuvers at Autonomy.
“Because our investigation into the accounting improprieties and misrepresentations at Autonomy remains ongoing, and given our referral of this matter to regulatory authorities in the U.S. and the U.K., it would not be appropriate for us to provide a more detailed description at this time,” he said.
Wednesday, August 1, 2012
Sprint Reports Loss on Nextel Write-Down
Sunday, July 29, 2012
Sprint Reports Loss on Nextel Write-Down
Thursday, July 26, 2012
Microsoft Reports 4th-Quarter Loss After a Write-Down
Saturday, July 21, 2012
Microsoft Reports 4th-Quarter Loss After a Write-Down
Monday, July 9, 2012
DealBook: Microsoft Takes Write-Down in Failed Digital Ad Foray
Microsoft owned up on Monday to the collapse of its biggest push into digital advertising, announcing that it would take a $6.2 billion accounting charge in its online services division for a failed acquisition.
The accounting charge, called a write-down of good will, was essentially a write-off of the value of aQuantive, a digital advertising company that Microsoft bought in 2007. It will effectively wipe out Microsoft’s fourth-quarter profit.
The company said it took the write-down because “expectations for future growth and profitability are lower than previous estimates” for the online services unit.
The charge will not affect the online services division’s operations or financial performance, Microsoft said.
“It’s disappointing, but it is not a shock at this point,” said Brendan Barnicle, senior research analyst at Pacific Crest Securities. “The industry has evolved beyond where aQuantive was when Microsoft bought it.”
Microsoft does make money in online advertising, but has relied on a number of digital advertising partnerships.
The deal for aQuantive was struck when technology and traditional advertising firms were desperately seeking footholds in the world of Internet display advertising. At the time, aQuantive was the biggest company Microsoft had bought in its history.
A month before the aQuantive acquisition, Google, Microsoft’s big rival in online advertising, purchased a similar firm, DoubleClick, for $3.1 billion. That deal has been highly profitable for Google, analysts say.
The purchase of aQuantive may well have been driven by pressure Microsoft was feeling at the time, not only from the DoubleClick deal, but by similar acquisitions by other companies. Microsoft bought aQuantive one day after the WPP Group bought 24/7 Real Media, another digital advertising company, for $649 million, and a month after Yahoo agreed to pay $680 million for Right Media, an online ad exchange.
All of the acquisitions were in one or another part of the display advertising business across the Web. Once highly profitable by indiscriminately pasting digital ads across the borders of millions of Web pages, the business has become under pressure as companies like Google got better at aiming for individual tastes with search advertising.
With DoubleClick, Google appeared to be using that personalization technology for the placement of banners and other display advertising.
Google used DoubleClick’s huge inventory of Web ads inside AdSense, Google’s self-serve ad placement technology for third-party Web sites.
AQuantive was a well-respected online agency based in Seattle, but its focus was on design and client services. The company did have ad inventory and an ad placement engine similar to DoubleClick’s at the time, but Microsoft did little to update it.
“It could have been another DoubleClick, but they would have had to know a business where publishers and advertisers meet, and then invest heavily,” said Todd Sawicki, chief revenue officer at Cheezburger, a publisher of several popular Web sites.
“Microsoft bought aQuantive in a reactionary move to Google buying DoubleClick, thinking that ad serving was its core strength,” he added. “Then they woke up the next morning and realized what they had.”
Brian McAndrews, the chief executive of aQuantive, was promoted to head Microsoft’s publisher and advertising group in August 2007, but left the company in December 2008. Now a venture partner with the Madrona Venture Group, Mr. McAndrews was recently elected to the board of The New York Times Company.
The poor performance of aQuantive has not hurt other parts of Microsoft’s online ad business. The company’s Bing search engine has grown, as has its revenue per search. Microsoft has struck a number of partnerships, including with Yahoo, WPP and App Nexus, which does real-time ad placement.
In May 2011 Microsoft paid $8.1 billion for the communications company Skype, its biggest purchase, and one that is thought to be going well for Microsoft.
Microsoft still has some innovative ad technology products, said Darren Herman, chief digital media officer at the Media Kitchen, a digital advertising agency. It may be using some of its partnerships to learn more about the online ad business as a prelude to an actual purchase, he said.
“There are a lot of people that think that Microsoft and App Nexus are going to link up,” Mr. Herman said. “It’s just a matter of when, not if.” Nonetheless, the end of possible competitor to Google’s DoubleClick ad placement engine left some even outside Microsoft feeling the sting.
“AOL has a small ad engine, and so does 24/7, but for ad placement it’s really DoubleClick or bust,” said Mr. Sawicki. “It’s a phenomenal failure.”
Tanzina Vega contributed reporting.